| Administrative History | Recorded as part of the 'Lives in the Oil Industry' oral history project |
| Description | Tape 1 Side A MARTIN GREGORY THOMPSON born 25 April 1946 Gosford, Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Currently Operations Manager, Offshore Division, Heal;th & Safety Executive. Mentions area of responsibility. One of three children. Details re siblings, their occupations. Recall's father's advice re own career in engineering. Paternal family: details re names. Grandfather a painter/decorator, very artistic.Details re his work. Grandmother was strict, had been a dressmaker. Maternal family: didn't know grandparents. Explains. Mother brought up by her aunt. Aged c13 when mother died. Details. Recalls childhood home, early schooling, growing up in Sunderland. Details re happy childhood in Sunderland area. Brought up close to sea. Details re father, an accountant. Recalls his meticulous record keeping. He took up skiing in his mid-50s, was involved in voluntary work. Memories of mother, family holidays. Recalls life after mother's death. Details re secondary school, passing 11-plus and other exams. Mentions time spent in France. Recalls father's situation during education. Not encouraged to read in childhood. Has read some children's books recently. Not a musical family. Mother played piano. Close family. Involved in church, sea scouts. Details. Family not political. Father Conservative, own attitude. No sense of class when growing up. Explains. Recalls sense of coming of major oil/gas industry in early 70s. No particular ambitions when at school. Mentions mining and other industry possibilities. Forte at school was maths, physics. Recalls teachers, school discipline. Went to University of Sheffield - first time away from home. Explains. Mentions university place offers. Importance of university years. First member of family to go to university. Explains.
Tape 1 Side B Went to Sheffield University 1964-7. Little social contact with lecturers. Details re leisure, social activities. Did combined electrical/electronic course. Recalls boring vacation employment with Generating Board at power station on River Tyne. Decision to go for electronic engineering. No awareness of North Sea oil industry. Joined GEC as electronic development engineer 1967. Details re GEC. Reference to transatlantic satellite communications. Involved in Ministry of Defence radar systems for missiles, eavesdropping equipment, Government Communications Centre. Details re own design work. Mentions advent of semi-conductors, integrated circuits. Explains high security procedures. Recalls dissatisfaction with work. Married 1969. Details re accommodation, move to Midlands. Details re wife, sons. Got job with GEC in Leicester 1970 as electronic development engineer. Details re communications equipment for mining etc applications. Recalls requests from oil/gas industry for equipment. Explains typical job. Any electrical equipment can create a spark - danger in oil/gas industry. Describes precautions taken, procedures followed, developments. This area was first major specialisation. Appointed Certification Officer in Electrical Equipment and Certification Service (Civil Service) 1974. Explains role, change from work in mining to oil/gas industry. Became part of Health & Safety Executive 1975. Reference to Safety & Mines Research Establishment. Mentions number of miners killed earlier through methane explosions caused by electrical equipment. Requirements of mining industry for bulky machines in contrast to offshore needs. Changes to British standards. Recalls first encounters with North Sea manufacturing companies wanting equipment certified, pressure to produce oil to free Government from Middle East problems. Explains legal status re certification. Example of British manufacturer adapting product for offshore, anxious to get certification.
Tape 2 Side A Certification Officer, 1974 (cont'd). Explains decision to import US technology that was not tried and tested, as claimed. Explains world-wide reputation of Buxton Certificates. Details re Buxton. Not pressured to hurry work but had long backlog. Explains nature of work testing equipment, need for thoroughness. Background to own appointment, relevance of electronic engineering experience. Upgraded testing equipment. Recalls difficulties with manufacturers, failing equipment. Department offered consultancy service to manufacturers. Attitude of people to certification delays. Explains limitations on staff numbers in civil service. Compares with current attitudes. Cooperation of manufacturers in testing. Explains hazards with high-voltage systems. Joined Department of Energy (DoE), Aberdeen 1979. Also involved in certifying mining equipment when in Buxton. Details. Background to move to work in Aberdeen. Significance for family of move to Scotland. Move seemed a natural progression. Explains. Mentions climate in Buxton. Work in Aberdeen completely new involving enforcement of offshore regulations. Explains. Own responsibility was for all UK oil industry. Details re staff in other areas. Different attitude of Americans to health and safety. Office was in Glasgow at first. Explains. Reference to OSO (Offshore Supplies Office), BNOC (British National Oil Corporation). Impressions of Aberdeen. Impressions of impact of Americans, industry on Aberdeen. Own role was to encourage, improve standards, look generally at health and safety standard offshore. Details re regular accident investigations, particularly in diving, scaffolding areas. Explains involvement of police, procedures followed. Recalls first investigation - on Ninian platform - illustrating pressures, stresses of job. Unofficially given loose rein to work outside rule book. Had considerable powers e.g. could stop any operation. Details re procedures, including court work.
Tape 2 Side B Department of Energy (cont'd). Had considerable powers re situations offshore. Details. Oil companies aware of health and safety standards. Explains their cooperative attitude. Some companies better than others. Recalls rudimentary communications in early days. Details re inspections, reports. Went offshore two weeks out of three, developed good professional relationships. American OIMs (Offshore Installation Managers) different. Recalls one chewing his cigar. Drilling OIMs totally American. Recalls dealing with one who couldn't read or write. OIMs were reliable, corrected any faults pointed out by inspections. Surprised by steadily improving standards set by oil companies in North Sea. Compares with situation onshore. Fatal accidents offshore brought about by urgency to get the job done. Explains. Own job was 'firefighting' because of a shortage of staff. Details. Links with London colleagues. Importance of consistency in regulations. Senior management didn't realise the significance of growth of industry. Details re number of installations, number of visits. Reference to Scottish Environmental Protection Agency. Relationship with OSO, DoE. Recalls reaction of OIMs when installations shut down. Details re situation surrounding shutdowns. No time to introduce prevention programmes. Mentions non-unionisation of industry. Some leading oil companies had internal safety initiatives. E.g. Shell 'Target Zero' programme. Comments on under-reporting of accidents, information coming through the grapevine. Explains inspection procedure, contact with crew etc. Accident rate was higher during construction phase. Impact of changing fortunes of industry. Major air disasters dealt with by Civil Aviation Authority. Own areas of responsibility after accidents. Main law was Health & Safety at Work Act. Mentions other legislation. EEC regulations restricted to onshore. Impact of work, night calls etc on family life. Mentions salary.
Tape 3 Side A Recalls Burgoyne Enquiry 1978-80, which resulted in closer involvement with Health & Safety Section. Details. Explains Health ?& Safety at Work Act offshore Agency Agreement. Piper Alpha disaster 6 July 1988. Recalls hearing news on radio. Went offshore early next day. Explains normal procedure offshore following accidents. Recalls lack of hard information from Occidental during night of disaster. Details re flight offshore. Impressions of Piper - had visited before. Recalls confusion at heliport meeting after disaster. Details re interrupted flight, chaos. Expected to land on Piper. Describes sight on arrival. Landed on floating installation Tharos - met by off-duty Piper OIM. Stayed offshore 7-8 days. Recalls other people offshore. Describes remains of Piper, flames, etc. Worked with police interviewing people. Details re photographs - vital evidence - taken by visitor offshore, used to aid interviews, later published in Cullen Report. Recalls diver survivor who swam from Piper to Tharos. Survivors taken to Aberdeen. Red Adair brought out by Occidental to deal with fire. Explains own safety role, relationship with Adair. Comments on his approach, public perception of him. 20-30 oil wells feeding the fire had to be dealt with. Explains. Problems with safety valves. People sent over to Piper Alpha by boat, suspended work baskets. Recalls taking formal written statements from everyone. Explains background to investigation procedures. Recalls fatigue, 18 hours per day work, need for sleep, work routine of police. Recalls exemplary conduct of Occidental senior staff. After returning ashore worked with Health & Safety inspectors. Own reaction at finding how little had been done onshore, lack of interview s with relevant personnel etc. Worked continually for 6-8 weeks.
Tape 3 Side B Piper Alpha disaster (cont'd). Interviewed all survivors, others working in Piper Field, Occidental onshore engineering staff. Took over 600 statements. Started to form an idea of cause early on. Recalls daily investigation meetings. Kept open mind. Importance of talking to people involved in process leading to initial incident, like doing jigsaw. Final key pieces of information came from the process operator and electrical technician. Point of ignition not known. Details re point of release of gas cloud. Recalls announcement of enquiry, requirement to stop DoE investigation work, hand over papers indicating chain of events. Details re procedure covering public enquiry. Own conclusions re cause of disaster confirmed by enquiry. Reaction to enquiry. Surprised no legal action taken, nobody called to account. Details. Piper Alpha completely insured, Piper Bravo built. Changes to authority to Health & Safety Executive, DoE, resources provided, changes to legislation, Cullen recommendations. Agreement between Government departments not to argue in enquiry. Reference to Burgoyne Report. Feelings about changes. Recalls earlier shortage of inspectors, extent of coverage, nature of evidence to enquiry about this. Own view re cause of disaster, culture of production, management failings. Reference to Claymore platform. Advantage of current safety-case regime, possibility of identifying management failings. Recalls disaster interview routine, survival stories, importance of mental ability, attitude during disaster. Most who died in accommodation module. Details re one survivor's Lego reconstruction of the platform, other's jumps from helideck. Own approach to work, dealing with disasters. Now Operations Manger, Offshore Safety Division, HSE (Health & Safety Executive). Background to appointment. Details re changes, approach to recruitment of c400 for safety case regime.
Tape 4 Side A Trade union side became more prominent re health and safety. HSE used tripartite process when setting up new regulations, worked closely with employers, trade unions. Attitude of unions re safety standards, occasional misunderstandings of what regulators could do. Now regular meetings with unions. Importance of channels of dialogue. Always safety representatives offshore. Lead inspectors, appointed for each installation, liaise with safety reps. Recalls challenges appointing new inspectors, two years getting them up to speed. Explains new safety-case regime as required by Cullen, risk assessment, reduction. Explains process of acceptance of safety cases, usually after improvements to management, hardware. Opinion as to whether Piper Alpha could happen again. Many other countries model regimes on HSE. In US, still a prescriptive approach. 1997 change of government to Labour raised profile of health and safety. Explains. Mentions Conservative attitude to unions. Details re new HSE charging regime, possible effect of this. Comments on separation of DoE and HSE. Current pressures re railway inspectorate, people have been moved there. Greater flexibility to move resources now across sectors. Health and safety standards more consistent but still vary across companies. Currently second-tier companies coming to North Sea, some majors leaving. Impact of this on health and safety. Maintenance crucial for safety. Explains tension between cost competition, efficiency, staffing, maintenance etc. Explains role of HSE, move from lagging indicators to leading indicators, concentration on human factors. Current state re accidents, hydrocarbon releases. Resources available for development of programmes. Feelings about own role. Comments on BP-Amoco standby boat controversy, current regulations. Improvements in quality of standby boats, crews. Attitudes of stakeholders in controversy.
Tape 4 Side B Comments on regulating nature of own work, enjoyment of work and people. Appointed to present post of Operations Manager 1999. Expects to retire at 60. Details re personal situation. Mentions other interest e.g. hillwalking, golf, skiing, travelling. Job has been high-pressure. Future prospects for North Se oil industry. Aberdeen's future as oil capital for Western Europe, possibilities of manufacturing industries there after the oil. Comments on public perception of oil/gas industry. Current HSE initiatives include reduction in hydrocarbon releases, reduction of injuries, occupational heath and safety. Explains. Recalls frequency of lost fingers etc in late 70s early 80s. Recalls use of chains for pipe-handling.
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