| Description | Stating that he be held responsible for the failure of the army [See 'MS 3470/6/1/1678'] but stating that he advocated in principle the attack on Rosetta and Rahmamie (to protect the food supply of Alexandria) but not the method: believing that had the first attack taken place when he recommended it, i.e. 20th and 23rd Ult., instead of the 29th ult., when the garrison had been strengthened, the result would have been different. Believes that the second attack was a sound recommendation to save the honour of the British arms. Confirms his statement that local inhabitants are friendly to the English but the Army with their previous experience of Egyptian operations should have employed officers with that experience, and surely it wasn't for him to point out the plundering propensities of the Arabs. Regrets that he had not been advised earlier of the expedition so that he could have worked on the Beys. Points out the extent to which the local inhabitants will be exposed to the Albanians on the evacuation of the troops from Egypt |