| Description | Tape 1 Side A: DAIRMID ALEXANDER MACALISTER HALL born 10 July 1949 Edinburgh. Background to names. Comments on having unusual names. Eldest of three boys. One brother works for Total. Other in printing. Explains own current job in Shell as HSE (Health & Safety Executive) Advisor, Production Directorate. Details re changes to Shell regional structure. Involved with logistics. Explains. Mentions multi-partner arrangements on some platforms. Own involvement in Europe. Good health and safety practice transcends national boundaries. Explains. Recalls childhood home. Paternal family: father a farmer, in Army during war, part of 51st Highland Division, taken prisoner. Details. He later went to Palestine with Army, returned to family estate in Kintyre, did agriculture course in Aberdeen. Details re his war. Describes him, his appearance and character, formality. Details re his early lifestyle on estate with staff etc. Estate still in family, much reduced. Recalls visits there in childhood. Still goes there. Maternal family, White: grandfather an engineer in merchant navy, started laundry business in Edinburgh. Knew grandparents well, introduced to boats, sailing by grandfather. Explains own continuing involvement in boating. Brought up on farm near Edinburgh. Describes. Recalls working on farm as child. Explains dangers for children on farms. Compares safety awareness then and now. Impact of farm experience on approach to own work now. Mother had gentile background. She joined Wrens. Describes her, her approach to dress etc. Education: went to prep school in Edinburgh, Glenalmond boarding public school near Perth. Feelings about being away at boarding school. Own children went to local academy in Aberdeen.
Tape 1 Side B: Details re wife's education, feelings about fee-paying schools. Recalls discipline in own school. Details re daughters, Hazelhead Academy. Recalls formative influence of uncles, maternal grandparents. Explains interest in boats. Feelings about winning, is competitive in boating. Compares with attitude at work, school. Comments on role as oldest of three in family, need to make bow-wave, dealing with fashions etc. Had to play sport at school. Feelings about headmaster. Recalls his pipe-smoking, cane. Career aspirations when at school - Royal Navy, farming. Was in naval section of CCF (Combined Cadet Force). Was a reader when growing up. Recalls war comics. Family went to church. Glenalmond College had strong links with Episcopal Church. Reference to founder, Gladstone. Attitude to religion now. Studied agriculture 1968-72 at Edinburgh University for Higher National Diploma (HND). Expectation of many on course to take over family farm. Not under this pressure. Joined Naval Reserve, then Royal Navy as Midshipman at Dartmouth 1972. Describes Dartmouth. Mentions Iranians, Nigerians, Egyptians being trained there. Wide social spread compared with Army. Navy was meritocratic. Services twenty years behind social standards outside. Example of customs in wardroom. Feelings about Dartmouth. Services want free thinkers but give beginners hard time in first weeks. Comments on naval customs. Dartmouth experience valuable for later life. Joined Navy on short service commission. Explains options available. Not conscious then of oil industry. Recalls seeing first gas platforms. Industry had low profile. Spent time on fisheries protection vessel. Reference to Common Market fishery policies; Russian fleets; Dutch, French fishing vessels. Countries were jockeying for position re fishing. Navy had policing role. Mentions twelve-mile limit.
Tape 2 Side A: Royal Navy (cont'd). Recalls involvement in Cod War. Details re situation, naval confrontation. Unsuccessful British operation. Compares suitability, versatility of Icelandic, British ships. Explains Icelandic process of cutting trawler nets, limited British naval response with big ships. Own ship, Apollo, in collision with Icelandic gunboat, both damaged. Details re death of Icelandic welder. Impact of this. British crews felt wrong to be in situation. Comments on British tactics, respect for Icelandic crews. Recalls excitement of situation. Details re wife, her study, later work with Marks & Spencer. Details re daughters. Background to leaving Navy. Got job with insurance company. Explains dissatisfaction with this. Father sold farm. Details re his situation. Background to joining oil/gas industry. Joined Shell as Offshore Installation Supervisor 1978. Mentions marketable naval qualifications, shortage of suitable people at time. Interviewed for job in Aberdeen. Details re panel. Mentions other, agricultural, job possibilities. Had to do RGIT (Robert Gordon's Institute of Technology) survival course at Montrose. Describes first trip offshore, to Dunlin, flight to Sumburgh, rudimentary facilities there, general disorganisation. Compares with naval situations. Recalls guide - overhung from night before. Describes Dunlin, then still being built. Shell was on hard learning path re politics, time necessary for completion of construction offshore, costs. Pressure to get oil flowing, show things were moving. Platforms shipped out before ready, sometimes produced oil briefly, then shut down to complete. Little financial control. Mentions current Shell investment off Nigeria using FPSO (floating production storage & off-take). Explains poor project management, filtration of bad news. Installation sent out with 200,000+ man-hours to be done. First oil will be late.
Tape 2 Side B: No backlog of experience in industry. Gives example from early days. Productivity was sometimes low. No platforms had been built in as inhospitable locations as North Sea before. Examples of causes of downtime. Was OIS (Offshore Installation Supervisor), deputy to OIM (Offshore Installation Manager), didn't know much about it. Limited training in principles of oil refining. Skills required of captain of ship, OIM. No pool of offshore oil industry experience in UK at time. Dealt with cranes, helicopters, supply vessels, catering crews etc. Describes situation offshore, living conditions, platform still being built. Mixture of nationalities. Reference to McDermotts. Little entertainment. All-male environment. Compares discipline offshore with Navy, recalls egalitarian regime. Non-performers NRBed (not required back). Free-for-all hire-and-fire in contracting environment. Unions not represented offshore though many individual union members. Was not in union. Shell paranoid re union. Explains. Little pressure for unionisation re pay. Even now no single union in North Sea. Details re situation. Feelings re unionisation, Shell. Mentions father's conservative position. Recalls industrial action on Brent, caterers' strike. Recalls washing up. Mentions Kelvin Catering staff killed in Dan Air Sunburgh crash when going offshore during strike. Health and safety felt to be good at time. Recalls Shell permit-to-work system. Explains hazards of building and running a refinery offshore. Safety record worse than now. Attitude of authorities to complaints re safety, attitudes of workers. Didn't feel overly worried about it. Got used to certain risk level. One change - less authority to use own judgement. Explains. Significance of having written procedures, more rules. Greater profile for personal accountability now. Drilling was highest-risk area. Explains.
Tape 3 Side A: Typical daily routine as OIS including dealing with permits to work. Communication by radio, telex. Daily OIMs meeting re priorities, inspection of jobs, dealing with shipping. Explains complex work for ships alongside, difficulty maintaining location, dependence on weather. Mooring ropes sometime broken. Danger of impact from ships. Explains present-day POSCON (position control). Today ships bigger, better controlled. Recalls meals routine. Normally worked twelve-hour day. Supply ships came any time of day, night. Few recreation options. Used ships' radio for home contact, not private. Impact of job on family. Compares shift system with Navy routines. Shell had masses of rules - gives examples of regulated activity. Compares with today. Had no consciousness of other companies, little exchange of industry information. Recalls Aberdeen in early days of industry, arrival of Americans in cowboy hats, boots. Compares Aberdeen with Edinburgh. Reaction of Aberdonians to industry, attitude of Press & Journal. Recalls standard dress of 'oilies', own reaction to this. Onshore-based OIS 1982. Details re responsibilities including contracts. OIS on Brent Alpha, Brent Bravo 1986. More career development potential. Life seemed to be continual crisis. Explains. Recalls flotel barge for hundreds of people when on Brent Charlie. Too many people can result in lessened productivity. Difficult to motivate people, easy to de-motivate. Explains. Role was jack-of-all-trades, had to ensure all facilities available. Own approach to work, dealing with people. Recalls traditional Dutch tool-pushers' approach. Recalls effective, straight-speaking ex-naval OIM Barry Hartwell. Relationship between offshore/onshore personnel, tension. Piper Alpha disaster: onshore at time. Recalls seeing news. Shell attitude to Occidental, attitude to possibility of similar situation in Shell. Mentions Shell emergencies.
Tape 3 Side B: Piper Alpha disaster (cont'd): comments on implementation of Cullen Report, safety cases. Reference to nuclear industry, Health & Safety at Work Act. Benefits of new regime not immediately seen. Post-Piper legislating was goal-setting rather than prescriptive. Reference to Health & Safety Executive (HSE). Appointed OIM, Brent Spar 1988. Lived on board. Describes Spar, its operation, mooring, role. Details re process of separating water from oil, difficulties involved, supply of oil, process of linking to exporting tankers. Details re their destinations. Describes layout of Spar, machinery etc. Top section rotated. Lift went to 150 feet sub-sea, oil tanks below. Quiet atmosphere. Describes motion in different conditions. Spar had saturation diving system for inspection purposes etc. Hole down centre for diving bell. Recalls surge in hole during rough weather. Dimensions of Spar, accommodation. Spent three years on Spar. Details re fatal helicopter accident, six deaths. Opposite number was a survivor. Worked two weeks on/three weeks off routine. Able to take holidays. Feelings about accident. Recalls its impact, need to carry on. Appointed MMSC (Modification, Maintenance and Service Contract) Representative in Brent 1991. Explains role. Shell saw itself as exploration and production company, contracted drillers, maintenance and engineering people. Shell short on perks, eg company cars, but paid competitive salary. Never thought of working elsewhere. Explains. Attitudes of people to Shell. Terms and conditions better than in contracting companies. Reference to Wood Group. Spent time helping to write safety cases. Explains different parts of safety cases, specialisations, eg management, risk assessment, approach to dealing with risk. Explains term 'inventory'. Problem with inventory on Piper at time of disaster.
Tape 4 Side A: Further details re risk assessment. Mentions QRA (quantified risk assessment). Details re safety case book that had to be approved by HSE by certain date. Worked on Brent safety cases 1992. Explains adaptation of safety cases for various platform types. Explains documentation, role of manuals eg for helicopter work, maintenance. Had to be able to back up everything with facts. Process done platform by platform. Consultation with workforce - questions re value. Explains. Problem with technicalities difficult for many to understand. Prepared 'Safety Case in Simple Form' leaflets. Development of Safety Representatives, enshrined in legislation. Attitude of Shell which feared unionisation. Difficulties in condensing safety cases for leaflets. Safety cases continually upgraded. Leaflets part of approval process to ensure that operators competent, able to operate platforms safely. Explains. Attitude of HSE, recalls disagreements, challenges re safety cases. Example of Sheerwater Platform 1996-7 design safety case. HSE not a pushover. Mentions OILC (Offshore Industry Liaison Committee) role as pressure group, Shell's informal relationship with them. Awareness in 1992 of Enterprise Oil; their Nelson Platform designed, built by Shell. Reference to Esso, BP, and smaller companies. Appointed Platform Services Coordinator 1992. Details re role implementing amalgamation of positions, coordinating tasks etc. Involved in job losses, choice of people for redundancy etc. Shell good at handling personnel issues such as this. Reason for absence of many union members in Shell - staff committee. Details re their involvement in staff reduction decisions. Company treats staff well. Appointed Materials Coordinator, Brent Long Term Field Development/OIM Brent Spar Abandonment 1994. Background to appointment. Reason for decommissioning Spar - cost of necessary repairs, upgrading etc.
Tape 4 Side B: Brent Spar disposal (cont'd). Possibility of reuse of Brent Spar. No maintenance after 1991, no-one on board. Abandonment project team tried to identify options re disposal. Difficulties with its shape, ballasting, draught, dismantling locations in UK. Recalls consideration of deep water abandonment, environmental situation. Dangers of Spar breaking during disposal. Details re its contents including oil, emulsion. Mentions earlier emptying operation, other materials to be disposed of. Recalls naturally-occurring low-risk radiation in sludge, plans for these. Disposal as proposed would have had little impact on environment. Study done by Aberdeen University. Shell had to apply to Oslo-Paris Commission - no concerns expressed. Own role was to work out, carry out operation safely. Mentions others involved. Had to satisfy HSE that Spar safe to work in again. Details re earlier problem with hydrogen sulphide gas, fatal poisoning of three men. Recalls ensuring gas-free atmosphere, planning for other hazards, difficulties on Spar. Requirement for temporary lighting, ventilation, communication systems. Spar was like Marie Celeste. Explains. Recalls earlier abandonment 1991. Planned to use semi-submersible diving vessel, Stadive, as hotel ship/base. Two weeks before Shell operation due to start, Greenpeace voiced objections to disposal at environmental conference Copenhagen 1995, raised previously low profile of operation. Explains approvals obtained by Shell from UK DTI (Department of Trade & Industry) etc, North Sea bordering countries. Recalls hearing on radio of Greenpeace boarding Spar by sea. Details. Location of Spar. Details re Greenpeace communications, media presence. Shell taken by surprise. Explains attitude of Police who used squatting analogy, felt not empowered to intervene. Shell sought eviction order. Recalls own continuing preparations for abandonment.
Tape 5 Side A: Brent Spar disposal (cont'd). Details re possibility of towing Spar from location, tow points on Spar. Present at Shell's legal attempt to get eviction notice. Details re case before High Court judge at Court of Session, Edinburgh but Shell only knew name of Greenpeace leader on Spar, Jonathan Castle. Recalls flying to Spar, having to ask occupants to make landing possible, serving eviction notice, leaving. Mentions Sheriff's Officers, overnight stay. Describes manner of Greenpeace people, their appearance. Concerned re their safety. They were warned re dangers. Greenpeace wanted to take high-ground. Explains. Recalls media publicity. Shell concern re next move. Own feelings re Greenpeace position, Shell abandonment plans. Neither police, nor civil courts could help. Decision to set target date using North Sea legislation that allowed OIM to ask people on installation to leave - or use force as necessary. Details. Test of the law. Necessary to get on to Spar, possibility of resistance, risk of injury etc. Recalls attitudes of Shell, Greenpeace. Details re Greenpeace's damaging claims re amount of crude oil on board, toxic time-bomb etc, Shell's response. Details re preparation for boarding. Mentions Greenpeace support vessel, Moby Dick. Explains their means of access to Spar. Recalls day of boarding, weather conditions, colleagues from Shell Security. No arms taken. Accompanied by Police who were there to ensure public order only. Recalls standoff for 24 hours. Explains need for element of surprise re timing of boarding. Describes plans for boarding in basket by crane from Stadive. Recalls confidence re what going to do.
Tape 5 Side B: Brent Spar disposal (cont'd). Kept in touch with Shell people onshore. Describes day waiting for boarding operation to take place. Mentions improvement in weather, decision to board next day. Explains need for surprise element when landing on helideck. Debris etc placed on helideck. Recalls alarms sounded when boarding begun, shouting of people on helideck, and in boarding skip. Mentions Police presence. Tense situation with Greenpeace people trying to push skip away. Recalls boarding, reading scripted instructions, different languages etc. Reaction of Greenpeace people - chained to rails etc. Television crews also there. Describes difficulty prising hands from guardrail. Mentions Shell Security. Protesters adopted passive resistance. Details re protesters hiding in parts of superstructure, their use of smokebombs, difficulties retrieving last protester locked in area secured with hydraulic doors. Describes Jonathan Castle, his supplies, enough for two weeks, his reaction. Comments on concern re things going wrong in operation. Reference to Police. Started preparing facilities on Spar as planned. Protestors flown back to shore. Greenpeace ship stayed around. Had to ensure against re-occupation. Reference to Security people. Greenpeace re-boarded early one morning, hosed them with water. Details. Shell leaders ashore concerned re hosing. Explains use of water cannon from ships, aimed at base of Spar. Protesters left of own accord later. TV coverage of use of water cannon. Explains different possible perspectives of actions. Mentions explosives on board in position for eventual disposal of Spar. Had to cut mooring chains using explosive charges. Explains cause of Greenpeace's mistake re quantity of oil in Spar tank. Rectification of did not make big news at the time.
Tape 6 Side A: Brent Spar disposal (cont'd). Describes domestic status of Spar after occupation. Found full video-editing suite, satellite dish etc established by two TV crews on board - capable of live broadcasting. Mentions BBC's later admission re favouring Greenpeace material. Continuation of preparation of Spar for tow, disposal; dangerous disruption of Greenpeace ships. One Greenpeace person fell in water, rescued by Shell. Recalls misleading headline next day. Start of tow, details re plans for detonation, fears re Greenpeace actions. Two protesters landed by helicopter during tow. Details re media coverage. Recalls planning for another boarding as OIM, buying equipment from shop, flight to Stornoway Airport, plan to board from helicopter by knotted rope, rumour that SAS (Special Air Service) going to retake Spar. Change of mind by Shell same day John Major defended it in Parliament. Spar taken to Norway. Explosives, detonators undone. Details re military firing system. Greenpeace people had been on board with explosives. Big change in Shell. Technically strong but failed to persuade public re case for dumping Spar in Atlantic. Long dialogue re disposal of Spar. Comments on why it went wrong for Shell, strength of Green movement in Germany, Holland, Shell's loss of market-share in petrol retail sales, acts of violence against Shell. Greenpeace admitted mistake re statistics. Major success for them. Comments on Nigerian situation, corruption, Odoni people, sabotage. Shell suffered damage reputation-wise because of working with Nigerian Government. Explains. Recalls attempted visit back to Brent Spar with accuser - who refused to go out; study done by DNV, efforts by Shell. Appointed Senior Safety Officer 1995. Involved in corporate safety issues. Explains.
Tape 6 Side B: Comments on use of electronic equipment offshore. Involved with Tripod accident causation theory developed by Shell, University of Leiden, Netherlands, concerned with underlying causes of accidents. Details. Explains Tripod Delta which aims to identify weaknesses in organisation that could lead to accidents. Mentions Tripod Beta - investigation tool. Tripod Delta in abeyance. Explains. Attitude now to safety in North Sea, its priority over production. Mentions cost of accidents. Attitude of new smaller companies. Always pressures on operators. Eg North Sea an expensive operating area. Platforms getting older, needing more maintenance by fewer people. Comments on temporary repairs as on Brent Bravo where there was recent fatal accident. Underlying causes of this accident go back 10-15 years. Explains. Mentions deep-learning review in Shell re accident. Reference to HSE, likely prosecution of Shell. Impact of fatalities on company. Appointed Emergency Response Adviser 1999. Explains role. Difficulty with having most people on platforms coming from contracting companies, potential impact of accidents on Shell's reputation. Had linkage with other companies, Police, Coast Guard, DTI etc. Piper-type disaster still foreseeable. Management etc systems failed on Piper. OIMs now get competency training. Explains other changes, selection process for OIMs. Hazards rather than dangers offshore. HSE Adviser to Shell Expro Logistics 2002. Explains role. Biggest risk area is on supply vessels in low-hazard husbandry tasks. Details. Mentions safety awards, incentives, risk of accidents being hidden. Comments on human aspect of accidents. Own future plans, possibilities. Career in retrospect. |